Third-party monitoring and environmental data manipulation: the case of air quality control in Chinese cities
Published in Handbook on Climate Change and Environmental Governance in China, 2024
The high-powered performance target-based responsibility system and the central-local information asymmetry jointly incentivize local governments in China to manipulate environmental quality data, particularly air quality data. The central government implemented several nationwide reforms to reduce the information gap after 2010, and the third-party air quality monitoring system has been introduced since 2015. However, the literature paid little attention to whether the situation has changed due to these reforms. This research quantitatively examines China’s reforms in environmental monitoring system and the effectiveness of these measures in improving the credibility of air quality data. The results of Benford’s law, McCrary test, and regression discontinuity design support the argument that data manipulation has decreased after a more centrally based monitoring system was built by the central government. Despite data fabrication is difficult to identify and mitigate, the case of air quality regulation in China suggests it is practically viable.
Recommended citation: Wang, C., & Ma, L. (2024). "Chapter 20: Third-party monitoring and environmental data manipulation: the case of air quality control in Chinese cities". In Handbook on Climate Change and Environmental Governance in China. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Retrieved Mar 3, 2026.
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